Abstract: The value-freedom of scientic knowledge is commonly hold to be a necessary condition for objectivity. Helen Longino's contextual empiricism aims to overcome this connection. She questions the suitability of the normative ideal of value-freedom and develops an alternative conception of objectivity, which integrates social and epistemic aspects of scientic enquiry. The function of this notion of`social objectivity' is to make value-laden assumptions assessable through a process of criticism, even if there cannot be any guarantee of their elimination. This assessability requires common standards of evaluation, which are threatened by Longino's rejection of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values guiding theory choice. I will argue that in order to resolve this inherent tension, social objectivity has to be understood as based on a procedural epistemology and, diering from Longino's own approach, must include the normative requirement to strive for consensus instead of allowing for epistemological pluralism.
Introduction
The value-freedom of science has traditionally been considered a necessary condition for its objectivity, while objectivity lies at the core of science's claim to epistemic integrity as well as authority compared with other modes of beliefproduction.`Objectivity' here roughly refers either to the results or the processes of producing beliefs about the natural world that are determined by impartial and non-arbitrary criteria. Accordingly, the elimination of subjective inuences such as values from the justication of scientic contents is often seen as essential for what bestows worthiness on the endeavor of science in the rst place.
Value-freedom has however been thoroughly questioned in the last decades.
On the one hand, its philosophical soundness is challenged by underdetermination arguments; on the other hand, work in the history and sociology of science casts doubts on the value-freedom of much actual science. Today, it is widely accepted that value-freedom understood as an empirical thesis about science is often problematic. But while it is granted that not all science is value-free, the idea that it ought to be (as value-free as possible) is often held on to. Given its supposed relation to the notion of scientic objectivity, this perseverance is unsurprising. Following this line of reasoning, the regulative function of value-freedom understood as a normative ideal is what prevents science from collapsing into politics or religion, and the degree of its realisation therefore serves as a criterion of epistemic quality.
Related debates about science and values used to be characterized by a strong opposition between philosophical and sociological (especially social constructivist) approaches. The former tried to exclude social and especially value-laden inuences from the justication of scientic contents, adhering to rather strict conceptions of objectivity and scientic rationality; the latter argued on an empirical basis for the ubiquity of such inuences and inferred an illegitimacy of the scientic claim to objectivity. This opposition of sociological versus philosophical accounts has proven infertile in so far as the social`overdetermination' seems to be an account of scientic practice at least as implausible as any epistemological`overidealisation'. Dissatisfaction with this dichotomy constitutes one of the starting points of social epistemology, which aims to explain how scientic knowledge is produced in a social framework without loosing its epistemic integrity.
Here, I will discuss one of the most inuential as well as controversial accounts in this eld: Helen Longino's contextual empiricism. Longino not only criticizes the ideal of value-freedom but also develops a normative alternative called`social value management', which is based on a reconceptualisation of`objectivity' as inherently social.
1 The thesis I want to bring forward is that social objectivity provides a valuable notion, yet exhibits a lack of soundness in connection with Longino's insistence on the mere local reach of normative epistemological claims.
In what follows, I will rst introduce contextual empiricism and the concept of social objectivity, and proceed to highlight that Longino's contextualist approach diers from a relativistic one by the central role it ascribes to shared standards of theory assessment. I will then explain how these standards are threatened by her rejection of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values guiding theory choice decisions. Concerning this problem, I will argue that the assumed lack of any absolute, xed standards of theory assessment does not necessitate an epistemological pluralism or the rejection of non-empirical standards as being merely of heuristic nature, as Longino's work suggests. Rather, this lack calls for an epistemology that is procedural on multiple levels, which must moreover include the normative requirement of a strive for consensus on appropriate goals, standards, and contentseven if there is no Archimedean point this striving could be based upon.
1 Another account important to mention in this respect is Philip Kitcher's ideal of wellordered science (cf. Kitcher 2001) . Well-ordered science is a science that is socially responsible and democratic regarding the direction of research. Here, decisions on the choice of research problems are ideally made by representatives of dierent societal groups, who are tutored by impartial scientic experts. Since Kitcher largely holds on to the connection of the valuefreedom of justication and objectivity described above, I will concentrate on Longino's more radical proposal. In contrast to her social value management, well-ordered science does not aim to replace the ideal of value-free science, but rather supplements it by an external democratisation of the`context of discovery'.
Social Objectivity and the Problem of Local Epistemologies 215 2. Contextual Empiricism and Social Ob jectivity Helen Longino's critical contextual empiricism rejects the ideal of value-free science and the related understanding of objectivity as the production of impartial knowledge. Her starting point is an underdetermination thesis concerning evidential relations.
2 Following Longino, the relevance of data to the assessment of a theoretical hypothesis is not given by the data as such but presumes their interpretation in the light of beliefs about the examined state of aairs and its connections with others. The relation between theoretical hypotheses and empirical consequences is not one of logical entailment, but underdetermined and mediated by background assumptions. These background assumptions can be of methodological as well as of substantial nature, and include for example suppositions about the ontological structure or the relevant causal relations to be found in a research eld. Crucial here is that according to Longino, these background assumptions are possibly value-laden (cf. Longino 1990, 4048) .
A prominent example stems from evolutionary anthropology, where fossils of bones, footprints, or tools (besides questionable analogies with contemporary primates or gatherer-hunter-peoples) provide an empirical basis utilized to support contrasting hypotheses. The`man-the-hunter'-model relates the use of tools to the activity of hunting, thereby signifying a traditionally male activity as the decisive promoter of human evolutionary progress. In the 1970s, female scientists entering the eld developed the`women-the-gatherer'-model, which traces the usage of tools back to activities like gathering, digging, and preparing food, i.e. to a domain traditionally perceived as female. The given empirical evidence is insucient to choose between those alternative accounts, and it seems plausible that the ascription of tool usage to a presumably male domain is supported by value-laden background assumptions, which are not shared by the opposite side.
It moreover seems suspicious that both models conform to contemporary gender role conventions (cf. 106111).
In this case, the same empirical data are utilized to support contrasting hypotheses (informed by directly opposed values). Another possibility is that incompatible theories are each supported by empirical evidence, but are not empirically equivalent (i.e., the supporting data dier in these cases). An example is provided by Longino's detailed case study of research on gender-specic behaviour. She distinguishes two explanatory models applied in the concern-ing studies: the`linear-hormonal model' and the`selectionist model'. The rst is based on evidence of correlations between behaviour and prenatal hormone levels, and interprets this relation as a causal one between hormones and neuro-physiological development (in turn leading to behavioural dierences One of the main lessons of the underdetermination argument is that there are no formal rules, guidelines, or processes that can guarantee that social values will not permeate evidential relations. If this is so, then it is a contingent matter whether a given theory produced according to the best rules is value-laden or not. (Longino 2002, 50) For her, this possibility does not lead to a rejection of scientic claims to objectivity, but rather calls for a rethinking of objectivity that integrates the role of background assumptions. Longino considers the latter as possibly identiable by a process of mutual criticism. This criticism enables the scientic community to discover value-inuenced assumptions and to gradually screen them out. for the related hypotheses, it is highly probable that this premise will in turn be reenforced.
On the other side, by concentrating on environmental inuences, hypotheses about the variable nature of behaviour and neurological structures are likely to gain empirical support. The body of accepted theories we end up with essentially depends on the framing of research, which might be value-laden (see also below).
However, the criticism might itself be informed by values, as in the case of thè woman-the-gatherer'-model:
It puts women at the center of the evolutionary story, but the women bear a remarkable kinship to contemporary stereotypes. While this framework is as gynecentric as its rival is androcentric, its great value from a logical point of view is its revelation of the epistemologically arbitrary character of the man-the-hunter framework. (Longino 1990, 130) Due to this possibility, there can be no guarantee of the value-freedom of scientic The social nature of science thereby becomes an epistemic resource and constitutes the very possibility of scientic objectivity. As a consequence of this, structures and institutions of the scientic community, which are supposed to promote the process of criticism, gain normative relevance. Longino names four community-related criteria for the evaluation of objectivity: the existence of recognized avenues for criticism (1), community response to this criticism (2), shared standards of theory assessment (3), and equality of intellectual authority of all qualied participants (4) (cf. 6283).
The last condition of intellectual equality is important because Longino assumes that values are often taken for granted by those who hold them, which is why shared values of a scientic community will be hard to detect through mutual criticism. In connection with the plausible premise that a person's values correlate to a considerable extent with her socio-cultural background, this leads to a demand for the integration of diverse perspectives, i.e. participants of dierent social status, religion, gender, political orientation, etc., into the scientic community and the process of criticism. It is the interaction of participants with dierent values that is supposed to enable a community to make value-laden background assumptions visible.
Contextualism versus Relativism
In order to highlight some important aspects of Longino's position, I think it is helpful to discuss as exemplary an article by Tara Smith, in which she criticizes the social account of objectivity for being relativistic:
Essentially, what social objectivity delivers is merely a bridled relativism. At core, it is no more objective than the unbridled relativism that Longino wishes to avoid. (Smith 2004, 145) This charge of relativism results from an understanding of Longino's view as a consensualist account, which invites the call for a standard external to a group's agreement in order to evaluate objectivity:
Knowledge certainly does often benet from the contributions of many people. It does not follow from this, however, that others' beliefs should become the standard of objective knowledge. Yet this is the implication of the social conception, which replaces the relevant reality as the arbiter of knowledge with a group's`critical consensus'.
Contrary to Smith, the point of`social objectivity' is not to replace reality with consensus, but rather the theory-ladenness and potential value-ladenness of any understanding and perception we can have of the world, which implies the impossibility to assign reality the role of an impartial touch-stone of scientic claims. Every achievable account will rest on some background assumptions, which mediate the relation between theory and empirical evidence. Since these assumptions might be value-laden and lead to systematically biased results due to individual or collective preferences, there is a need for a mechanism to check their inuences. This is exactly what social objectivity wants to oer with its request for mutual criticism from dierent perspectives, which, according to Longino, will leave us with the best theories available: those scientic contents that have survived the thorough process of challenges from all possible sides.
This does not require merely consensus as such, but a consensus arrived at while maintaining certain conditions. There must be established procedures and media for criticism (1), diverse perspectives must be considered (4), and every relevant criticism must be answered (2). Most crucially, the consensus in question is not just a resulting majority vote because the criticism and evaluation of theories must invoke public standards for theory acceptance (3). Thus, at least not every result is a possible candidate for consensus, and the group's agreement is not a sucient condition. For the empiricist Longino, these public standards moreover contain as a necessary requirement the empirical adequacy of theories, which is why the allegation that believing, like wishing, does not make things so (Smith 2004, 148) is not to the point.
In order to distinguish knowledge from (majority) opinion, Longino develops a notion of epistemic acceptability that combines social with empiricist requirements. While her conception of objectivity refers to the procedures of a scientic community, epistemic acceptability refers to the contents thereby produced:
Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A is or is supported by data d evident to C at t in light of reasoning and background assumptions which have survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available to C at t, and C is characterized by venues for criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of intellectual authority. (Longino 2002, 135) To count as knowledge, scientic contents must conform to the relevant data.
Longino's criticism of the value-free ideal holds on to the minimal condition of not simply replacing the role of evidence by subjective preferences. But the selection and interpretation of data depends on background assumptions that might incorporate value-laden conceptions of the subject-matter. Therefore, epistemic acceptability of a hypothesis is not provided by its accordance with data alone, but requires in addition the hypothesis' exposure to every possible criticism of the community. To ensure the eciency of this criticism, the community must meet the social conditions for objectivity.
Public Standards and Theory Choice
The role of background assumptions explains why accordance with data is necessary, but insucient for the evaluation of theories. For Longino, the gap opened by underdetermination is closed through the process of mutual criticism that makes value assumptions assessable. Yet, Smith has an important point in her call for external criteria, which are supposed to inhibit a closure of the gap by means of value-conform choices among empirically adequate alternatives. Therefore, the existence of shared standards for theory assessment (3) is at the core of a socialised understanding of objectivity, if it is to function as a condition for the epistemic acceptability of scientic contents. Since the process of criticism is to result not only in consensus, but in a somehow justied and epistemically trustworthy consensusand empirical adequacy alone is insucient in this respectthis criticism must proceed on the basis of other, non-empirical criteria of epistemic acceptability.
The discussion of such non-empirical criteria traditionally proceeds under the label of epistemic values in theory choice. The problem of theory choice is generated by the possibility of dierent theories each compatible with the data, but incompatible with each other. According to him, they result from a learning process as to which properties of a theory enhance its truth-probability:
Even though we cannot denitely establish the values appropriate to the assessment of theory, we saw just a moment ago that we can provide a tentative list of criteria that have gradually been shaped over the experience of many centuries, the values that are implicit values in question are properties of good theories and as such, their realisation can serve as a criterion of epistemic quality.`Criteria' and`standards' I will use synonymously.
7 Besides this list, there are of course others which add criteria or interpret them dierently;
here, I will however concentrate on Kuhn's classic enumeration. Ontological heterogeneity attributes the same importance to dierent sorts of entities, rather than announcing one sort the standard versionwhich, according to Longino, is prone to regard dierences as deviants or even deciencies.
Instances of the problematic character of simple ontologies can be found in medical research. For example, before the development of women's health research, studies on coronary heart diseases used to focus exclusively on men, which led to a designation of diering female symptoms as`atypical' (eventually resulting in a higher female mortality rate) (cf. for example Kolip/Kuhlmann 2005, 141172; Schiebinger 1999, 107125; Epstein 2007 , especially chapters 3 and 11).
Complexity of relationship is the processual version of ontological heterogeneity and stresses interactions of dierent factors rather than one-way causalities.
An exemplary case can be found in reproductive biology and the consideration of the female egg as passively waiting for its fertilisation by the aggressive sperm, which was superseded by the ascription of a more active role to the egg (cf. for example Martin 1991) . This value is justied as guarding against a naturalisation of power relations; moreover, complex models are supposed to be more apt to recognise female contributions. Ontological heterogeneity and complexity of interaction are opposed to an ontological interpretation of simplicity as well as breadth of scope, which are thought to lead to a problematic disregard of indi-vidual dierences and interactional connections.
11 Another example of the value of relational complexity is the conict between linear-hormonal and selectionist explanations of neuro-physiological development and gender-specic behaviour mentioned above. The latter replaces the uni-directional simplicity of the former by an interactionist account, which can be considered as promoting a view of gender-dierences as depending on the social context and therefore alterable, rather than supporting social inequalities by a biological grounding. (Longino 2008, 79) 11 These oppositions are somewhat at odds with the Kuhnian interpretation of his criteria;
he relates simplicity to the unication of results rather than to the reduction of entities in an ontological framework, and scope to the inclusion of unforeseen results rather than to the reduction of explanatory principles and relational complexity, as Longino understands him to.
To make the contrast more straightforward, she would need to spell out the connection of her ontological interpretation to the respective ideas about unication and explanation. However, a failure of her oppositions would not per se discredit the idea of feminist cognitive values.
Two problems need to be discussed here. The rst is the lack of communityexternal standards of theory assessment. If each community has its own standards serving as basis of the critical process, it is hard to see how to avoid that This generates a tension with Longino's demand for criticism from dierent perspectives within a community (cf. also Lennon 1997, 44.) . All members of a so dened community will share certain values, which make them pursue the same goal and the derived constitutive values. This seriously diminishes the chance that value-assumptions are made visible by mutual criticism.
The diversity of criticism would therefore have to be accomplished by intercommunity discourse. This generates the question of how such a criticism between dierent communities can be eective, where each community has its own constitutive values respectively criteria of evaluation. Comparability and shared standards would presume a consensus on specic and often value-laden goals of research, which is neither a probable outcome in a group characterised by diversity, nor intended by Longino's contextual empiricism and its stress on plu-
rality. Yet without common standards, the outcome might be a methodological It is neither a good choice to refuse the possibility of non-empirical criteria of theory choice nor to make them exclusively dependent on individual communities' goals in a way that leads to local epistemologies and methodological incommensurability. The local and provisional nature of cognitive values must not preclude inter-community debate, but has to be accompanied by the demand to defend them to non-community members in relation to one's research goals; and where dierent goals and standards lead to incompatible results, they themselves need to be exposed to the process of mutual criticism from diverse perspectives. As Longino puts it herself:
The satisfaction of goals of inquiry is not ascertained privately, but by evaluation with respect to shared values and standards. This evaluation may be performed by anyone, not just by members of the community sharing al standards. Furthermore, standards are not a static set, but may themselves be criticized and transformed, in reference to other standards, goals, or values, held temporarily constant. Indeed, the presupposition of reliance on such standards is that they have survived similar critical scrutiny. (Longino 1996, 40) 13
In the end, Longino's conception of objectivity requires the emphasis on the social character of enquiry to be accompanied by one on the procedural nature of social objectivity.
14 This proceduralism maintains on three levels: rst, the discussion of scientic results from diverse perspectives; second, the debate on appropriate standards of theory choice; and third, the deliberation on appropriate research goals. On all levels, it is possible that disputes remain unresolved.
But what makes social objectivity possible is that the participants aim at a resolution by means of extensive and multi-perspectival criticism. In order to assure this eort of multi-level debate, the social conception of objectivity must include the normative ideal of an inter-community consensus. Even if it might not always be achievable, the strive for consensus is what saves social objectivity from collapsing into the problematic epistemological pluralism Longino's own approach allows for. To part the ideas of value-freedom and objectivity, the attention to the social context of science must thus be accompanied by a thoroughly procedural epistemology, to which not the success but the constant eort to overcome any incommensurable local epistemologies is essential. a role to play in theory choice decisions; but by shaping the research in earlier stages, they also decisively inuence these decisions in so far as they aect what alternatives there will be to choose from (cf. also Ohkrulik 1998) . Whether those alternatives might all incorporate the same value-laden assumptions is in turn again a question of social objectivity. Here, the ideal of integrating as diverse perspectives and values as possible into the scientic community comes to bear again by encouraging pluralism with regards to the sort of approaches pursued.
Before settling on any theory choices, it seems uncontroversial that this would in the best case be done in the light of numerous, signicantly dierent alternatives, which may highlight the blind spots of each other.
In addition to Longino's criticism of the value-freedom of justication, this signies the contexts of discovery and pursuit as an important topic for social epistemology. Such heuristic inuences shape what theory choice decisions we will eventually confront and what evidence will be available, which is why they are epistemologically relevant. At the same time, the social dimension of these heuristics calls for attention; their relation to specic, possibly value-laden research goals suggests that`discoveries', traditionally treated as rather coincidental in philosophy of science, bear a more systematic connection to the social background of science. Value-inuences are not only of normative interest when it comes to the nal evaluation of epistemic acceptability, but rather require a permanent monitoring.
15
To sum up, the social and procedural conception of objectivity, which does not ground on the value-freedom of science but rather on the reection and open discussion of the values at play, can provide a coherent and fruitful account of how to deal with value-inuencesbut only if it includes the normative requirement to strive for inter-community consensus.
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